The road to Srebrenica: Automobility and belonging in a post-socialist/war milieu

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Abstract
In this passenger-seat ethnography, I chart and explain the rise of hyper-automobility in post-socialist and post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, I explore how automobility enables the production of ideas of home that involve (re-)scripting Bosnia’s dominant modes of identification. Firstly, I argue, in the face of growing pressure for categorical ethno-national identification, the restricted nature of automobile communication and the specific conditions of Bosnia’s automobile system enable non-national and pan-Bosnian senses of belonging and communality to be perpetuated through driving. Secondly, I argue, the comforting familiarities of car, road and the pan-Bosnian “society of traffic” enable a perambulatory approach to driving. In this respect, the disposition of the driver is much like that of the flâneur. Just as s/he was sensuously attuned to capitalism’s and modernity’s manifestations in the streetscape of nineteenth century Paris, Bosnia’s drivers are often similarly attuned to the newly ethno-nationalised and otherwise de-familiarised landscapes through which they pass. This experience, I argue, provides an occasion for the (re-)scripting of antithetical ethno-national and pan-Bosnian belonging into senses of a benign multiculturalism.

KEYWORDS: automobility, nationalism, post-socialism, post-war, Bosnia

Introduction
Even the most extreme traumas rarely disrupt the articulation of everyday life’s mundanities (Maček 2009). For example, living amidst the aftermath of a horrific war, my informants from the city of Tuzla in post-war north-eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina revelled, like ordinary people the world over, in talk about celebrity, cooking, football, the weather and traffic, especially traffic! The common sentiment, as one man put it, was ‘the roads used to be quiet, but since 1998… whoosh!’

The Bosnian war of succession from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia took place between 1992 and 1995. At its heart was a process of territorial ethnic homogenisation. More than 2.2 million people (Phoung 2000), approximately half its pre-war population, were displaced. Moreover, in what has been described as a process of domicile (Porteous & Smith 2001; Dawson 2014), in which landscapes of home are rendered functionless and meaningless in order to prevent return, 60% of Bosnia’s housing stock was either severely damaged or destroyed (UNHCR 1997). The war was brought
to an end by the Dayton Agreement\(^1\) (Dayton). Dayton established the partition of Bosnia by an “Inter-Entity Boundary Line” between the new “entities” of the Bosnian Serb-dominated Republika Srpska (The RS) and the Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim)-dominated Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (The Federation). The post-war period has also involved pressure to (re-) establish a Croat-dominated entity in southwestern Bosnia and Herzegovina (Herzeg-Bosnia). Dayton’s civilian implementation was tasked to the newly established Office of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR). This included the management of the subject of this article: transport.

In this article, I consider one of several peculiar post-socialist and post-war (henceforth abbreviated as post-socialist/war) phenomena in Bosnia, that of hyper-automobility. In the first part, I attribute the sharp rise in traffic that people spoke about to three key factors: policy change, especially the de-ethnicising of the vehicle licensing system; the rise of trading as a ubiquitous economic activity; and, most importantly, a contradiction at the heart of Dayton that led to a situation of sustained residential transience for many people. However, hyper-automobility consists not only of a dramatic rise in traffic but also of qualitative changes to the practice of driving itself. To illustrate the point, rarely did I ever see my informants actually sell any of the wares that they moved around. Indeed, in some extreme cases, it seemed as though driving in order to trade was a mere ruse to escape the boredom and tensions of unemployed lives lived increasingly in the domestic domain. At one level, there was a marked change in the manner of driving with, so my informants claimed, efficient journeys between departures and destinations giving way to exploratory perambulations through Bosnia’s transformed post-socialist/war landscapes. At another level, there was a marked change in motives for driving. Echoing the idea of “therapeutic automobility” (Ferguson 2009), people drove increasingly, so my informants claimed, simply to ‘feel good.’

Interpreting the meaning of these qualitative changes to the practice of driving in my research presented, however, considerable challenges. Notably, informants’ articulations of the emotions they experience whilst driving were, invariably, merely exclamatory and inchoate; typically, and again, for example, driving helps one to ‘feel good’. Perhaps this is not surprising. At least when done well, driving involves relegating the quality of in-car communication to keeping ‘your eyes on the road, your hands upon the wheel’ (The Doors 1970). Furthermore, emotions are, of course, intimately linked to the individual life histories of the people who experience them. Importantly, as numerous commentators have observed and argued, especially through use of theoretical tools such as the idea of “ontological crisis” (cf. Steele 2008), the life histories of Bosnia and Herzegovinian’s have invariably undergone exceptional disruption, wrought by post-socialist/war transition (ibid.). Central in this respect, so all my informants volunteered, was the dramatic rise of ethno-nationalism. This brought with it, above all, immense pressure for personal

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\(^{1}\) The Dayton Agreement, otherwise known as the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, put an end to the three and a half-year long Bosnian War. It was reached at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio, USA, and was formally signed in Paris, France on October 15th, 1995. It was brokered largely by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher and negotiator Richard Holbrooke and was signed by key representatives from the main erstwhile warring nations in former-Yugoslavia: President of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, President of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović, and President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milošević. Milošević also represented Bosnian Serb interests in the absence of their leader, Radovan Karadžić.
ethno-nationalist identification and the de-familiarisation of Bosnia’s erstwhile familiar social milieu and landscapes.

Following this, and in order to render the inchoate intelligible, in my analysis I triangulated my informants’ expressions of their emotions whilst driving (henceforth presented as indented quotations in the text) with the following: life history data on my informants about the issues to which these emotions are related, especially their personal experiences of the post-socialist/war pressure for ethno-nationalist identification and of the de-familiarisation of Bosnia’s erstwhile familiar social milieu and landscapes; broader ethnographic and secondary data about these phenomena; and passenger-seat ethnography (see also Cuban & Fowler 2012; Huijbens 2007; Hussain 2007; Laurier et al. 2008; Nóvoa 2012) from the many car journeys I undertook with my informants. Furthermore, I also triangulated my informants’ expressions of emotions whilst driving with key theoretical observations from what has been described as the “automobilities turn” in the social sciences (Miller 1991; Featherstone 2004; Dalakoglou & Harvey 2012). However, above all, it is with Lynne Pearce’s feminist scholarship on home, belonging and automobility that my research resonates most. Pearce describes the ways in which long distance driving becomes, ‘an emotional palimpsest of past and future, in which events and feelings are recovered and, most importantly, re-scripted from the present moment in time’ (2000: 163). More to the point, as Sheller summarises Pearce, ‘suspended in the motorway’s spatio-temporal continuum of in-between, the imaginative empowerment of the chronotopes of the road promote an exploration of various fantasies of home, which are at once psychological and material, personal and national’ (2004: 234). On the basis of my research, I found, and suggest in this article, that driving often represents an important occasion for people to come to terms with the profound transformations taking place in post-socialist and post-conflict (cf. Czegedly 2004; Bishara 2015) Bosnia. In particular, it is an occasion for “(re-)scripting” Bosnia’s three dominant modes of identification: ethno-national, pan-ethnic Bosnian and multicultural.

Whilst grounded in large-scale ethnographic research, befitting its bringing together of foci on emotion, life history, personal experience and the observation of the intimately personal and social space of the car within the context of wide-scale processes of social transformation, the argument is developed via a single illustrative case study, that of Mira Čelić, a Bosnian Serb woman with whom I passengered on many (I retrospectively estimate thirty) occasions on her frequent journeys between and around her north-eastern Bosnian home city of Tuzla and the town of Srebrenica. However, this is not solely a pragmatic strategy designed to allow presentation of the depth of detail that biography affords. It is an approach consistent with other anthropological accounts that explore wide-scale social transformations as they are manifested intimately within a few (Lavie et al. 1993; Rapport 1993) or one (Herzfeld 1997; Jackson 2005; Okely 1983; Shostak 1981) lives. More specifically, it is an approach that takes its lead from Devereux’s psychoanalytic anthropological work on the “Ergodic Hypothesis” (1978). Devereux argues that to generalise by way of averaging large numbers of individuals’ traits or seeking common denominators or “representativeness” is a corruption of identity. Instead, he recommends, the anthropological endeavour should consist of appreciating how in one human being humanity is to be found humanity (see also Rapport 2007

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2 A pseudonym is used in order to protect confidentiality.
and 2012). In Mira, who, typical of most of her peers in Tuzla, is a mono-ethnic first generation rural-to-urban migrant who ethnically intermarried and embraced pan-ethnic Yugoslav identification, I see a distillation of many of the meanings that driving holds for many of my Tuzlan informants more generally.

Using the approach I have outlined, in the second part of the paper, I describe growing post-socialist/war pressure for categorical ethno-nationalist identification. Against this, I argue, the restricted nature of automobile communication, wrought by the enclosed and pseudo-private social space of the cars themselves, and the specific post-socialist/war conditions of Bosnia’s automobile system enable a non-ethno-nationalist and pan-Bosnian belonging and communality to be experienced through driving.

In the third part, I describe Bosnia’s increasingly ethno-nationalised and otherwise de-familiarised landscapes. Against this, I argue, the comforting familiarities of car, road and a pan-Bosnian society of traffic enable an exploratory and perambulatory approach to driving. In this, the driver is attuned to the sights, sounds, smells and tastes of these de-familiarised landscapes. This kind of driving provides, I argue, an occasion for the (re-)scripting of antithetical ethno-national and pan-Bosnian belonging into a benign multiculturalism.

Overall, the article is written with a view to addressing two important critiques of contemporary automobilities literature. The first of these is a near overwhelming American and North European-centrism within automobiles research (for notable exceptions see Miller 1991; Gray 1994; Czeglédy 2004; Edensor 2004; Argounova-Low 2012; Dalakoglou & Harvey 2012; Klaeger 2012; Yazici 2012; Bishara 2015). The second is, as one might expect of scholarship about a practice that is frequently represented as taking place “betwixt and between” (see, for example, Pearce 2000), a tendency both to pay often minute and isolating attention to the practice of driving and the social milieu of the car itself (see, for example, Laurier et al. 2008) at the expense of understanding their relationships to broader social contexts (Vannini 2010). This article represents an attempt to develop further understanding of European post-socialist automobility (Argounova-Low 2012; Dalakoglou 2012), paying particular attention to one of that area’s most salient contextual conditions: the rise of ethnic nationalism.

Part I – Hyper-automobility in post-war Bosnia: policy, economy and return

A 1998 report by the OHR observed the high incidence of ethnically discriminate intimidation and arbitrary fining by police at the Inter-Entity Boundary Line between the RS and the Federation. Following the collapse of economy and state, the police were undoubtedly left with little option but to resort to nefarious means of income generation. Indeed, on a research trip in 2001, I became witness to this, in a hilarious manner. A colleague and I were charged the princely sum of 50 Bosnian Convertible Marks (approximately 25 euros) for the enforced disinfection of our car in a drive-through sheep dip. It mattered not that the car was registered in Bosnia. Apparently, so the border policeman informed us, the fact that its driver and passenger were from Britain rendered it a potential carrier of “mad cow disease”. Furthermore, and echoing a common sentiment in the RS that it is part of Serbia in all but official recognition by the International Community, he exclaimed, ‘the Serbian nation’s livestock had to be protected.’ The problem was further compounded by the high incidence of violence against cars outside the entity of their
registration (Dahlman & Ó Tuathail 2005). Again, on a family holiday in as late as 2006 I became witness to violence against cars when ethnically out of place when a petrol pump attendant in the RS pistol-whipped the wing mirror of my Croatian hire car.

The OHR concluded that such problems represented the “greatest obstacle to freedom of movement”, a prerequisite of successful post-war reconstruction in Bosnia (see below). Number plates, the OHR concluded, were the main problem (1998). So, in 1998, it introduced a uniform vehicle licensing system. In contrast to the previous system, the new plates did not denote place – town, municipality, canton or entity. Furthermore, only letters that are common across the Latin and Cyrillic scripts, which were now preferred in the Federation and RS respectively, were permissible (Aitchison 2007). In short, the system reduced the possibility of plausibly inferring ethnicity.

The huge upturn in automobility enabled by policy change was, undoubtedly, stimulated by two key factors. The first of these was economic collapse wrought by war and by the transition from self-managed socialism to liberal market capitalism (see also, Verdery 1996). In 2001, for example, the official unemployment rate for Bosnia stood at 40% and in some areas such as rural north-eastern Bosnia stood at 80% (Index Mundi 2013). This led to a near ubiquitous engagement in black and grey market trading. The trading took place both informally and in formal contexts, especially, though not exclusively, in the huge trading “cities”, such as Arizona and Virginia, that haphazardly sprung up near to American military bases in relatively remote parts of the country (Haynes 2012). The second, as I explain below, was “minority return”; the return of displaced persons to areas in which they now form part of an ethnic minority.

Dayton left a contradictory legacy (Dahlman & Ó Tuathail 2011). It was designed to bring peace, largely by recognition of the increasingly ethnically homogenised homelands (the “entities”) wrought by war. In contrast, Dayton was also designed to reverse ethnic cleansing. In this respect, minority return became a preeminent goal of the largely international governmental and non-governmental bodies tasked with Bosnia’s reconstruction. There were three cornerstone policies of return: restoration of pre-war property ownership as a fundamental right; massive investment in housing reconstruction; and, albeit to a lesser degree, measures designed to enable the travel to erstwhile homes, such as the new vehicle licensing system. Other measures, such as those designed to address the desperate economic conditions in these areas and, most importantly, the ‘volatile’ (Black 2001: 180) and ethnically sectarian domestic structures of governance took, it is commonly argued (Brubacker 2013), a poor second place.

In contrast to a later policy goal of what came to be termed “sustainable return”, Dayton produced, then, incentives for people to reclaim property without adequately producing conditions to enable permanent residency. Moreover, the disincentives to permanent return faced by minority returnees cannot be overstated. Maintaining their power bases and ideological missions, and continuing to ethnically cleanse by means other than war, many local nationalist politicians ensured the embedding of institutionalised ethnic discrimination. Furthermore, the villages and suburbs that had once been home often became no less hostile. Returnees were faced with living cheek by jowl with new and unwelcoming ethnic others; themselves embittered because their own residency was an outcome of their own displacement from elsewhere. Often these were people whom they had injured or who had injured them when, either by volition, fear, coercion or trickery (see, for example, Dawson 2009), ordinary people became incorporated into the process
of ethnic cleansing. These disincentives have barely receded through time, for with the new post-Yugoslav nationalisms’ progressive ontologising (Kapferer 1998) of the isomorphism of space and (ethnic) culture (Gupta & Ferguson 1992), the minority returnee is increasingly othered by the local predominantly ethnic Serb³ community and its representatives in local government and administration (Dahlman & Ó Tuathail 2011).

Consequently, as argued elsewhere (Dawson 2008), in many cases villages and suburbs took on several of the characteristics of what Augé describes as “non-places” (1995). Resembling the airport lounge, the quintessential locus of “super-modernity”, they are, to quote Clifford (1992), more akin to sites of “travelling” than of “dwelling”. Many so-called “returned” villagers engage in forms of astronaut migration (Ong 1999). They live on the original family property from which they had been displaced and work its land to support other members of their families living elsewhere, usually amongst co-ethnics in Bosnia or other parts of former Yugoslavia. Some merely sleep there, conducting most other aspects of their lives, such as work and the education of children, across the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, amongst other co-ethnics. Finally, many others continue to live elsewhere, more or less permanently, in other countries, other parts of former Yugoslavia, and other parts of Bosnia, visiting with varying degrees of regularity. Such was the situation in the case study that follows and that substantially informs Parts II and III.

Mira Čelić
Mira was born in 1950 and raised as a Yugoslav, identifying herself as Serb in a majority Serb, though mixed Serb/Muslim middle class, vikendica (weekender) village in the beautiful outskirts of Srebrenica. After completing high school and university in Bosnia’s capital city, Sarajevo, Mira took a job as a modern languages teacher at a high school in Tuzla. With the exception of prolonged study visits to the US and Germany, she has lived in Tuzla ever since. For most of that period she has, nevertheless, retained close contact with her natal village, initially to visit family and then, after her father’s death, to oversee the family’s fruit farming and picking business. This was, however, interrupted during the war because of the security situation, and especially the raids on the village by Bosnian military forces and Muslim people living in the desperate conditions of the Srebrenica ‘UN Safe Area’/enclave⁴. Through war and by means of ethnic cleansing, the village became denuded of its Muslim population and then its Serbian population and, in turn, effectively, was left abandoned. In the post-war era, however, the area was again resettled largely by returning Serbian locals and, in a somewhat atypical development, displaced Muslims from other villages in the area. Mira herself facilitated some of this. After formally reclaiming her land and property, she loaned the huts once used by fruit picker tourists from Sarajevo to the displaced Muslims from other villages in the area.

³ Reflecting common practice in Tuzla, I refer to Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs as, simply “Muslims”, “Croats” and “Serbs”.

⁴ In the early part of the war in north-eastern Bosnia many, largely, Muslims whose towns had been ethnically homogenised by Serbian military and paramilitary forces fled to the town of Srebrenica. In April 1993, the United Nations declared the town a ‘safe area’ under its protection. However, in July 1995 the contingent of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) sent to protect the area failed to prevent its capture by the Army of Republika Srpska and other paramilitary units. In the space of a few days, women and children were separated from men and boys and transported to other parts of Bosnia. Simultaneously, approximately 8,000 men and boys were executed. The event, known commonly as the Srebrenica Massacre, also has, following a ruling in 2004 by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), been officially classified as genocide.
Being locally situated made easier their attempts to reclaim and rebuild their own nearby properties. Cultivation of fruit provided a source of income during their temporary stays. As an educated Serb, she frequently acted as an intermediary in difficult negotiations with hostile local authorities for reclamation and return. Mira’s participation was ideologically undergirded: she was committed to the ideal of a multi-ethnic and, more so, pan-Bosnianist and Yugoslavist Bosnia. However, it was not without self-interest. She took a small income from the initiative, which was further managed by an NGO committed to post-war reconstruction through small enterprise. This gave her access to the NGO reconstruction sector, to which she was able to offer various kinds of paid service, especially translation. In the context of the diminishing income, she generated from her own profession as a teacher; these ventures increasingly formed a central component of her economic survival strategy.

Part II – Driving from Ethno-nationalism to Bosnianism
Historically, as the 1991 census demonstrates, Tuzla has been a majority Muslim city (52.63%) with much smaller minorities identifying by birth as Yugoslav (19.46%), Serb (15.68%), Croat (7.55%) and other (4.66%) (Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2013). In terms of everyday life, however, non-ethnic Yugoslav has been the dominant mode of identification. The most important manifestations of this were Tuzla remaining the only city and municipality in Bosnia to eschew the election of nationalist authorities throughout the war, and its near-total avoidance of the kind of internecine violence experienced by several other multi-ethnic Bosnian cities such as Mostar.

Tuzla’s multi-ethnic stability was, however, disrupted by Dayton’s division of the country into increasingly homogenous Muslim and Serbian entities, and commensurate pressure to (re-)establish a Croat-dominated entity in southwestern Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Herzeg-Bosnia”. Being in the Muslim-dominated Federation, widespread concerns about Islamisation emerged. These were inflamed by actions of the Bosnian state, particularly under the leadership of its pious President, Alija Izetbegović. Much was made, for example, of his advice to Muslims in the winter of 1996 to avoid celebrating Christmas, and the subsequent arrest of several men, including Muslims, for dressing as Santa Claus. More seriously, widespread offence was caused by the state’s creeping replacement of the term “Bosnian Muslim” by “Bosniak”. Likewise, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats who had most usually been referred to without ethnic nomenclature (Bosnian or Yugoslav) came increasingly to be referred to as “Serbs” and “Croats”. The transformations represented, respectively, a naturalisation of the link between Bosnia and Islam, and an othering of non-Muslim Bosnians. This was experienced by many people as ethnic piracy of an “inalienable” identity symbol (see also Harrison 1999), and the key one at that – Bosnia itself!

Amongst many Tuzlans, these concerns were of “moral panic” proportions (Cohen 1972). Three “folk devils” loomed large: the many displaced persons (DPs) who moved to Tuzla from rural Bosnia, especially the female survivors of the Srebrenica androicide in 1995; mujahedeen from Afghanistan who, according to rumour, were arriving in droves to marry these women; and wealthy Wahhabi post-war investors from the Middle East.

The following social phenomena in the former-Yugoslavia are well documented: a demonstrated lead role played by rural women in upholding traditional Islamic values
Bringa 1995); a comparatively greater tendency amongst rural people to identify ethno-nationally (Ramet 1996); a demonstrated predilection of rural Muslims to uphold the practice of endogamy; a belief across all groups that ethnicity is passed through the male seed, women merely being bearers who make no genetic contribution; and widespread concern, often substantiated by nationalist demography, about the capacity of rural Muslims to reproduce in comparatively greater numbers (Sophos 1996). In short, and especially following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, not only was Bosnia seen to be heading towards becoming overwhelmingly Islamic and Bosniak nationalist, but with the tainting of foreign interests, capital and sperm, fundamentally so.

Often, these developments were met by a politicised nostalgia for Tuzla’s historic pan-ethnic Yugoslavism (see also Palmberger 2008) or, more commonly in these times of Yugoslavia’s demise, by pan-ethnic Bosnianism. Amongst local secular Muslims, these sentiments were expressed very succinctly in the near ubiquitous phrase, ‘give us back our Serbs’ (see below on the post-war emigration of Serbs from Tuzla), meaning in place of rural Muslim DPs. Contrastingly, amongst growing numbers of local Serbs and Croats, these developments were often met with the newly found ethno-nationalist sentiment. This phenomenon and its unexpected post-war suddenness were communicated commonly through recourse to medical metaphor, “disease” and “spasm” respectively. According to this narrative, ethno-nationalism coursed through society, infecting even loved ones and one’s selves. Its symptom was a sudden loss of rational capacity, and its social outcome, the breakdown of social relationships. Such was Mira Čelić’s experience.

Mira had thought of her husband Boban’s Croatian identification as little more than a cute affect; expressed through a love of Croatian folk music and the occasional drunken rant about discrimination of “his people” by the disproportionately Serbified Yugoslav state. Their central marital tensions had, rather, stemmed from his alcoholism and his unrelenting demand for a third child, their first son, hopefully! However, echoing the post-socialist Croatian state’s moral majoritarian agenda (picked-up through co-ethnic conversation, cable TV and newspapers) with its emphases on demographic restoration, the primacy of the state’s right over the female body and incendiary slogans such as ‘the foetus is a Croat, too’ (Drezgić 1996; Helms 2013; Sophos 1996), he began characterising her reluctance for a third pregnancy as immoral. This, amongst other factors, hastened their separation and divorce. Following the divorce, Mira swiftly entered into a rebound relationship and marriage with Hasan, a Muslim DP whom she had dated in Srebrenica prior to her marriage to Boban. That marriage, however, proved to be equally ill-fated; motivated, as she explained, by the wrong reasons. Being beyond ideals of romantic love, neither she nor Hasan were oblivious to or concerned about the instrumental reasons for their marriage: a home for him; security for her; and, because this was a “mixed marriage”, greater likelihood of both of them achieving asylum overseas. Rather, what concerned Mira was the role that inappropriate guilt had played in her decision, guilt about the predominant role of “her people”, Bosnian Serbs, in ethnically cleansing “his people”, Bosnian Muslims. No different to her first husband, who she had left for this very reason, she had come to render herself by ethno-national category rather than as Yugoslav. Unwittingly, she too had been infected by the disease:

*Mira: I love driving. When I am driving, I feel like me again. I feel like I belong, if you know what I mean.*
When driving, Mira was like a different person to the one I knew in other contexts. Her clothes were different; the smart twinset she usually wore, replaced by trainers and tracksuit. Her comportment was different; a usual up-tightness replaced by an expansive posture, one hand on the wheel and the other flopping out the window to catch the sun. Likewise, her behaviour was much more relaxed. Gone were the fidgetiness and her usual way of talking (incessantly). Furthermore, I could not help noticing the material signs of wellbeing, especially the empty ashtray. Like so many people in Bosnia, Mira was, most of the time at least, a compulsive smoker.

Mira’s automobile wellbeing may, of course, be part explained as driving affording, as Inglis succinctly puts it, a sense of ‘being away and at home simultaneously’ (2004: 211). Certainly, Mira relished the feeling of escape from her everyday social milieu, and its attendant pressure for categorical identification. This was an affordance denied her even by her apartment, a space open to family and neighbours, many of whom had themselves become “ethno-nationalised”. In this sense, her choice of passenger, a “foreigner”, was not coincidental. More importantly, she enjoyed the familiar tactilities of the car. She enjoyed the feel of its backfiring engine. She named it, humorously “Edvard”, after Edvard Kardelj, co-founder of socialist Yugoslavia. Though famously crotchety, perhaps more than anyone else, he had, like a good engine, propelled the federation’s progress. Furthermore, she enjoyed its material familiarities, the lace, the fluffy cushions and the pictures of her grown-up daughters that sandwiched the nodding dashboard dog. In this uniquely intimate space, Mira could, indeed, feel like herself again.

However, whilst intimate, the experience of driving is rarely an isolated one. It happens in traffic. This has been represented generously as fulfilling contradictory existential needs and desires for solitude and proximity (Bull 2004). Conversely, it has been represented disparagingly. Marxist theorists writing in the post-WWII era were especially critical. The key symbol of the Americanisation of Europe characteristic of that time was none other than the motorcar industry, and driving was often seen as an expression of bourgeois individualism (see, for example, Boltanski 1975; Bosquet 1973) and the alienated conditions of late capitalism. As Lefebvre put it, driving ‘enables people… to congregate and mix without meeting, thus constituting a striking example of simultaneity without exchange’ (1971: 101). In contrast, and as a burgeoning array of new traffic ethnographies explore (see, for example, Edensor 2004; Klaeger 2012; Yazici 2012), driving can be an unusually sociable act, involving, as Lynch puts it, participating in a ‘society of traffic’ (cited in Edensor 2004: 211). The main manifestation of driving’s sociability is, of course, communication.

At one level, in the remarks made to other road users without being heard (Laurier 2004), driving involves an illusory communication. Much of the time, and especially at moments of automobile interaction (giving way, overtaking, cut-offs, blind-sliding, etc.), Mira almost constantly acted as though in conversation with other drivers.

At another level, driving involves actual but impaired communication. The importance of such impaired automobile communication in Bosnia, a context of ongoing and not infrequent inter-ethnic tension, cannot be understated. It provides a means of safely traversing ethnically segregated rural and urban territories. It enables safety through over communication. For example, as Gambetta and Hall also found in their study of Northern Irish taxi drivers (2005), on several occasions I witnessed the switching and re-switching of obvious symbols of identity to match context. For example, the Muslims I drove with
in the RS occasionally and very consciously displayed newspapers and religious symbols and adopted hand gestures commonly associated with Serbian identification. Conversely, it enables safety through under communication. The complex interplay of facework, bodywork and verbalisation in face-to-face, un-restricted non-automobile communication can cut two ways. When done well, a safe identity can be performed (Goffman 1971). When done badly, risky identities of one’s ethnic otherness can be revealed. The restricted nature of automobile communication obviates this. However, and no doubt influenced by the dominant Barthian paradigm in ethnicity studies, anthropology tends to understand such communication as (re)producing sectarianism (Barth 1969; Erikson 1993; Jenkins 1996). For example, it is represented as giving on, in lieu of communicants not meeting as “total social persons”, to an inevitable construction and perpetuation of experientially uninformed stereotypes of the ethnic other within, to use the Goffmanian terminology, the realm of the “backstage” mono-ethnic encounter (see, for example, Larsen 1982). However, this is not always so.

On a busy road on the outskirts of Sarajevo, we got stuck behind a slow moving tractor. Seeing that Mira wanted to overtake – in lieu of her malfunctioning indicator light she casually stuck her arm out the window and flapped it up and down – I checked behind for her. A guy in a truck was charging up the outside lane at full pelt, all the time frantically flashing his lights at us. Mira made to pull out. I shouted at her to stop, but she ignored me. The guy in the truck slammed his breaks on and, when we made it into the outside lane, came to within about a meter of hitting our rear bumper. Once passed the tractor, Mira casually pulled over again. As the guy in the truck passed, he and Mira exchanged smiles and waves. Mira then turned to me and shouted, “Calm down, bloody English passenger seat drivers. This is Bosnian driving. Me and Mustafa [a reference to the fact that we had been driving through a majority Muslim area] over there understand what’s going on.” Obviously, they were aware of some kind of driving etiquette that from my English driving perspective looked like nothing more than a recipe for suicide (Fieldnote excerpt).

Such choreographies of the road consist, self-evidently, of styles and conventions of driving that are locally specific, produced and monitored (Edensor 2004). Importantly, they have become un-reflexively embodied and embedded phenomenologies of driving (Thrift 2004).

I would argue that it is in such illusory, restricted and other forms of communication borne of un-reflexively embodied knowledge that belonging in driving, of the kind expressed by Mira, may inhere. Moreover, I would argue, and as Mira’s remarks suggest, this is a specifically non-ethno-national and pan-Bosnian belonging and, since it is shared, also communality.

Recent insights on the self-reproducing, path-dependent “assemblage” of cars, drivers, roads and their attendant technologies and services that Urry describes as the “system of automobility” (2004) may appear to render this finding counter-intuitive. This ‘awesome’ system of ‘global domination’, as he describes it (2004: 25), is manifested locally with distinctively national characteristics (Edensor 2004). Indeed, for example, as Edensor demonstrates, the “national motorscape” is one of the most “banal” and.
effective means through which nations are inscribed, celebrated and legitimated (Edensor 2004). Furthermore, the system has a remarkable capacity to inscribe itself within subjectivities and communities while, like the very best ideological tools, conveying otherwise. As Beckmann states, speaking about Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS):

Every new implant seems to dislocate the driver from the problematic ‘traffic community’ and enhances autonomy … However, this autonomy and independence is fictitious. The more human and non-human agents enter the roads, the tighter the actor-network is woven (2004: 89).

Furthermore, what also takes place is, ‘a reconfiguration of trust – from trust in the capabilities of other fellow drivers, to trust in the capacities of ITS’ (2004: 91).

However, these observations reflect the very particular American and northern European driving experiences on which most automobilities research is based. In Bosnia, as in other parts of post-socialist Europe, the kinds of well-functioning states and levels of GDP required to effectively develop the system of automobility, with the particular inflections of the new nation states, are conspicuously absent. Indeed, the motorscape is, in fact, replete with symbols of the vulnerability and failure of such a project. An infamous road sign pointing to the RS part of Sarajevo in Cyrillic and to the rest of the city in Latin was defaced and then ripped down within days of it being erected. Throughout Bosnia, signs with new Serbified names for ethnically cleansed towns were, likewise, defaced and ripped down. Moreover, in a case most telling of geopolitical relations, a common sight at Bosnian border posts with Montenegro is the small sign stating: ‘You are now entering Republika Srpska’. However, it is dwarfed by the larger signs announcing: ‘You are now entering Bosnia and Herzegovina’. These, in turn, are dwarfed by even larger signs denoting the presence of the European Union and (since all High Representatives have come from EU states) the OHR, which is commonly seen to be its local wing. Beyond such grand statements, the motorscape more tellingly gives way to the actual ubiquity of ancient and rusting signs denoting, however subtly, the now defunct Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In fact, the automobile system in Bosnia is, in many ways a socialist and pre-contemporary nationalist relic. Moreover, as the roadscape of potholes, non-functioning traffic lights, faded markings, and rusted road signs illustrates, it appears to be a crumbling system. In this context, one might argue, there is indeed a reconfiguration of trust also going on in Bosnia (see also Håkansson & Sjöholm 2005): from trust in the capacities of the system to trust in the capabilities of fellow drivers. In short, the post-socialist and post-war structural conditions on Bosnia’s roads allow for a distinctively non-ethno-national and pan-Bosnian phenomenology of driving to prevail and, thereby, I would argue, a non-ethno-national and pan-Bosnian belonging and communality to also be perpetuated through driving.

Part III – Driving from Bosnianism to Multiculturalism
Tuzla’s population profile remained relatively stable throughout the war. However, the trickle of emigrating Serbs, especially following the withdrawal of the Serbian JNA (Yugoslav People’s Army) troops in 1992, increased markedly in 1995. This was precipitated by a number of events: the massacre by Army of Republika Srpska artillery of seventy civilians in the city’s main square that led to a sharp rise in anti-Serbian sentiment; the war’s end that led to senses of empowerment to express anti-Serbian sentiment; and, of
course, Dayton’s establishing the majority Muslim Federation in which Tuzla was situated. More significantly, as noted earlier, the steady immigration of displaced Muslims from rural north-eastern Bosnia rose markedly in 1995, especially following the Srebrenica Massacre.

The arrival of the DP’s took place alongside the deepening of Bosnia’s post-socialist integration in international markets and post-war lifting of barriers to trade. One outcome of this was the arrival of large numbers of used Mercedes-Benz cars from Western Europe. Cars are often fecund “vehicles” for the articulation of concerns about social transformation, as Edensor demonstrates in his case study about post-industrial British working class masculinity, expressed through the idea of “White Van Man” (2004) (see also, Lipset and Handler 2014). In Tuzla, such was the case with Mercedes. As a signifier, it worked at a number of levels.

Firstly, in its most common First to Second-World down-cycled state it was a powerful symbol of Tuzla’s “shabbification”, wrought largely by the arrival of DPs. Some DPs were homeless or living in makeshift encampments, sometimes out the back of roomy old Mercedes.

Secondly, one of the urban myths circulating in the city was that these cars were the booty of Bosnian car theft syndicates in Germany whose members were, most often, the gastarbeiter (guest worker) relatives of rural Bosnians. The Mercedes was, then, a symbol of concerns about the alleged criminality of DPs, borne largely of desperation. In a typically Tuzlan anti-nationalist narrative, such desperation was often explained with reference to the phenomenon of the torbari (bag people). The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Srebrenica had, it was commonly claimed, incorporated the desperation of locals trapped by Serbian military forces in the enclave into its military strategy. Soldiers would weaken the military forces defending Serbian villages, then let loose thousands of starving men, women and children from the enclave. With bare hands and the most rudimentary of weapons, they would attack and ransack the villages (Sudetic 1998: 157). The fact that their leader, Commander Naser Orić, had decamped with them to Tuzla, where he now ran a local “muscle club”, did not help reduce local fears of a desperate crime wave to come.

Thirdly, as a sign of wealth and privilege, Mercedes ownership by DPs symbolised widespread and deep resentments about unequal access to resources. Unemployment and poverty led to increasing dependence on welfare provided by the state and NGOs. Access, however, was largely contingent on factors such as death, loss, injury and, of course, displacement through war. In short, getting by became increasingly dependent on a political economy of suffering that DPs were better placed to access. Furthermore, top of humanity’s perceived heap, in this regard, were the survivors of Srebrenica. Aided by the foundations and visits of high-profile people, such as Bianca Jagger and Bill Clinton, who were chauffeured in to share in their grief, they came to be labelled resentfully as “celebrity mourners”, in their celebrity cars, Mercedes.

Fourthly, exitability, as Baumann observes, is a key source of power and marker of distinction (2000). Indeed, the capacity to engage in international travel was a cherished peculiarity of the Yugoslav variant of socialism, especially amongst Bosnia’s middle classes (Drakulić 2000; Jansen 2009). This was a capacity increasingly denied them following 9/11 as fears of radical Islam led, so my informants claimed, to a marked tightening of border controls. It was also a capacity comparatively denied them as displaced
rural Muslim DPs, a key referent for such Islamophobia, were more likely than others to be granted asylum overseas. The Mercedes, a stable intercultural symbol of automobile quality (Koshar 2004), became one of several ironic symbols of this reversal of fortunes when driven by rural Muslim DPs.5

Having said this, the Mercedes symbolised, through the common phrase, ‘(s)he drives a Mercedes in bare feet’ (see also Jansen 2005), a widespread and more fundamental concern about the DPs that both encapsulates and transcends those concerning crime, inequality and, indeed, ethno-nationalism, Islamisation and over-breeding. With the exception of Greece, which benefitted from massive investment from the US, Yugoslavia urbanised more rapidly than any other European country in the post-WWII era (Glenny 2001). Anxiety about the robustness of Yugoslavia’s urbanity remains commonplace. As Slavenka Drakulić famously remarked, there is an ever-present awareness of ‘soil rising from beneath the asphalt’ (2001: 11). Likewise, it has been argued that specific minorities in the former-Yugoslavia symbolise a repressed rural, Balkan and wild selfhood that constantly threatens to break through an urban, European and civilised veneer (van de Port 1999). Concomitantly, urbanisation resulted in the very conscious construction of discrete urban and rural cultures. In this context, the barefoot Mercedes driver speaks of transgression, the DP as matter out of place (Douglas 1966) and the perceived twin threats of the post-war ruralisation (including ethno-nationalising and Islamising) and Balkan Orientalising of the city.

The large number of DPs in Tuzla did, indeed, transform its urban landscape, particularly through the presence of distinctively rural forms of attire such as the colourful headscarves of women, the ramshackle settlements, the rise in street trading, and a more “expansive” use of space, as one informant described it. In one instance, driving somewhere or other out of Tuzla, Mira and I found ourselves caught in a traffic jam wrought by a group of DP village boys whom I recognised from my neighbourhood playing football on the city bypass.

The presence of DPs was, however, merely one alongside many other, albeit smaller presences transforming Bosnia’s urban and rural landscape. These included, most significantly: the massive contingent of international military, governmental and non-governmental peace-keepers and re-constructers; the rural dance halls and brothels run by Mafiosi, staffed, largely, by trafficked Eastern European women and used, of course, by peacekeepers (Dawson 2008); the market stalls of immigrant Chinese who, exploiting porous borders, were trading their way with food, materials and plastic trinkets into Western Europe; and the rural trading cities where all of these groups and more mingled. They also included, less significantly, but no less dramatically a cornucopia of “freaks”, as they were referred to locally, each of which brought their own approach to resolving Bosnia’s problems. These included: various Evangelical Christian organisations and alternative health therapist outfits, such as “Naturopaths Across Borders”; war and post-war thrill seekers; and solidarity seeking refugees from other places. One such group was the fire-juggling “crusties” who, after being “moved on” in Britain by the Criminal Justice Act had originally found their way to Sarajevo. All they demanded in exchange for their

5 Another illustrative one relating to the issue of exitability was the checkered laundry bag (the bag of the bag people) in which many DPs carried their worldly possessions. It came to be known ironically as the “Refugee’s Samsonite”. 
pyrotechnic entertainment had been food; something that, in the context of “The Siege” had been in very short supply.

However, the strangest of all presences to most Tuzlans that I met was the dramatic rise of ethno-nationalist and related religious architectures and symbols that had been so frowned upon in socialist Yugoslavia:

Mira: *A lot of the time I feel like this is not my Bosnia anymore. It feels strange, and I feel scared. It’s different when I am driving. It mostly feels familiar and even when it doesn’t it’s OK. It’s interesting, a discovery, manageable.*

Mira was one of a decreasing minority of Serbs in Tuzla who stayed on after a war in which Serbia was widely recognised as having been the main aggressor. As such, she had good cause to feel increasingly estranged, vulnerable and discriminated against. This was born out of experience.

Her application for asylum in Canada was eventually refused. Such, however, was rarely the outcome of the asylum claims of the Muslim DPs that, in her work for governmental and non-governmental organisations, she was invariably translating and honing. More cruel than this was her inability to drive to see her eldest daughter in Hungary because of, she claimed, tightened border controls wrought by increasing fears of Islamic terrorism in Western Europe. Added to this, and seeing the experiences of some of her friends, she had been justifiably fearful that Muslim DPs could take over and resettle her apartment. This had been a motivating factor in moving in Hasan, her second husband, who was Muslim. Finally, in the context of the new and increasingly Islamicised curricula approved by the ruling Bosniak nationalist party, the SDA (Party of Democratic Action), her professional standing in the workplace had diminished markedly.

Unquestionably, both for Mira and many others in Tuzla (including secular Muslims), the post-war presence that symbolised most this estrangement and vulnerability was the “new mosques”. These were often built in the voids left by domicide and, invariably, were funded by Middle Eastern investors. Not only numerous, they were also much larger and ostentatious than their traditional Bosnian counterparts. They were referred to by many of my informants as “spaceships”, and not solely because of their rocket-like minarets. They were statements of the presence of powerful alien life forms.

In contrast to such changes, driving out on the roads was for many people I spoke to a soothingly familiar experience, and not solely in the sense of them being the site for experiencing a non-ethno-national and pan-Bosnian phenomenology of driving, belonging and communality. As Bette Denich (1994) incisively illuminates, roads were central to the socialist Yugoslav ideological project. Most famously, for example, the main road connecting the capital cities of Croatia and Serbia, the key historically antithetical nations in the federation, was called the “Highway of Brotherhood and Unity”. “Brotherhood”, connoting the equality of nations in the federation, and “Unity”, connoting pan-Slavic (Yugoslav) identification was the cornerstone domestic policy. More particularly, roads were central to the state’s memory policy. Notably, in many cases they were directionally laid out to avoid, and thus forget, sites of internecine ethnic violence in

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6 Between 1992 and 1996 Sarajevo was besieged originally by the JNA and then the Army of Republika Srpska.
WWII. Conversely, they were punctuated by vast monuments that commemorated inter-necine ethnic violence as, instead, sites of victory in a class war against external enemies and non-ethnically specific internal quislings. In short, I argue, Bosnia’s road network is often experienced as a strikingly familiar and powerfully non-ethno-nationalist and pan-Bosnian space, in contrast to the increasingly ethno-nationalised and otherwise de-familiarised landscapes it traverses.

It is tempting to attribute the sense of “interest”, “discovery” and “manageability” that Mira experiences when driving down to the combination of such familiarity and the oft-commented on near unrivalled feeling of being in control when driving (Featherstone 2004). This feeling is, it is argued, heightened by the insulating affordances of cars, such as the “sonic envelope” of car-audio (Bull 2004), and by the protective/threatening affordances of the “driver-car” (Dant 2004), such as its “exoskeletal” quality. Echoing the critical stance on automobility of his Marxist precursors, Urry views such affordances critically as reducing the ‘sights, sounds, tastes, temperatures and smells of the city and countryside … to the two-dimensional view through the car window (cited in Merriman 2004: 157). In the drive through Bosnia one might surmise, the threatening sights, sounds, tastes, temperatures and smells of the increasingly ethno-nationalised and otherwise estranged landscape are tamed by the power of the automobile ocular (Fabian 1984). However, this is not how Mira, nor most people I know in Bosnia drive.

Today’s Srebrenica trip was as rambling as usual. We took massive detours to Foča7 on the way there, and to Arizona on the way back. Mira said she knew about a couple of joints in either place where she could offload that big cheesy illuminated waterfall picture she had acquired. Neither worked out, but it didn’t seem to bother her.

I took along that 80s Greatest Hits album she was interested in, but she asked me to turn it off after an hour or so. She said it was depressing, how even the meanings of the songs that she had loved had been perverted by events. However, I think she was taking the piss when she illustrated this with reference to Springsteen’s Born to Run. A song about escape of young people from dreary rust belt town lives that she had related to “back then” now reminded her of other matters in light of the most recent of several historic exoduses of Bosnia’s Muslims. Actually, Mira usually prefers no music. Rather, she is attentive to, inquisitive about and talkative (!!!) about the journey.

Before we got into Foča we detoured a little to see the monument to the WWII Battle of Sutjeska... amazing! Them Partisans8 didn’t build things in half measures. Several hundred tons of highest quality communist concrete. Mira knew that some of the Chetniks9 that run local government in Foča had

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7 Foča had been a key site of ethnic cleansing, including the location of rape camps.
8 The Partisans, officially the ‘National Liberation Army and Partisan detachments of Yugoslavia’, were the main anti-Nazi resistance movement in WWII. It was led by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and its commander was Marshal Josip Broz Tito. It formed the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that was led by Tito until his death in 1980.
9 The Chetniks were a radical Serbian nationalist paramilitary force active in WWII, whose name is often used to describe radical Serbian nationalists in general.
changed the name of the town to Srbinje (literally, ‘place of the Serbs’). She wanted to see if this had made its way into the street signs and was delighted to see that it hadn’t. However, in Foča she spotted a bunch of guys in a bar wearing various extreme nationalist regalia, one with a Karadžić t-shirt. She kept circling around to get a clear picture of what the others had on their t-shirts. Not just embarrassing, it was pretty frightening, too. One of them shouted something. She gave him the four C salute. The guys cheered and reciprocated the salute. She described them as “nice boys, just as long as they keep their politics where it belongs, here in the fields”.

On the way up to Arizona we stopped outside a strip joint in the middle of nowhere called, hilariously, ‘Daytons’. Mira tried to get me to go in and get us both a beer. I didn’t feel comfortable. Instead, she parked outside and watched some punters going in and out. We had a bit of an argument. I find her view that prostitution is fine, as its good for local rural economies, not just a bit challenging.

The long journey up to Arizona was pretty uneventful. After failing to offload her mirror to the stall holder she’d heard about we spent a good hour cruising up and down the road, all the time Mira window shopping the stalls and commenting on the stallholders. Finally, she settled on a stall run by a Turkish guy where she bought a small fluffy monkey called Mickey, whose dick rises from his fur when you squeeze his belly. She said it was wonderful, not because of its naughtiness, though. Rather (and this is evident from all the other crap she has on her mantelpiece), it’s the fripperies of consumer capitalism that she so enjoys [see also, Berdahl, 1999]. As she explained, “Everything we had in Yugoslavia was bad quality, but it was always useful… this stuff is useless, but the quality is excellent… I love it”.

After cruising Arizona a bit more she stopped outside one of the Chinese stalls, and said she’d like to try this Chow Mein stuff she’d heard about. We ordered a bowl each, and she drove us over to eat outside one of the CD stalls that was playing some banging Turbofolk music. I thought the food was pretty greasy but ate it up because I was hungry. She had only a couple of mouthfuls, and then wrapped it up and put it away. She described it, and not at all sarcastically though probably dishonestly, as “exquisite”.

Finally, we puttered into the outskirts of Tuzla bang on the sundown call at that big new Wahhabi mosque by the second-hand clothes market. She parked outside to grab a sneak peek at the worshippers going in. I got the feeling she was trying to gauge how (un)popular it was. When she dropped me off at Faruk’s [my landlord] she was buzzing and wanted to come in for a few Tuzlanskos [the local beer] with Faruk and I. We sat on the veranda

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10 Radovan Karadžić was co-founded the radical Serbian nationalist Serbian Democratic Party in 1989 and President of Republika Srpska from 1992 to 1996. Indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), he was a fugitive from 1996 until his arrest in 2008. He is now in the custody of the ICTY.

11 The four C salute is a Serbian nationalist gesture, Samo sloga Srbina spasava, meaning ‘only unity saves the Serb.’

12 A musical form popular in both Serbia and Bosnia that is often associated with Serbian nationalism.
and she talked the hind legs off Faruk about the day’s events. She’s like a kid in a candy shop after these excursions. I nodded off. Ringing left ear. Knackered (Fieldnote excerpts).

Mira’s drives, like those of many others with whom I passengered in Bosnia, are often exploratory perambulations rather than efficient journeys between departures and destinations. In this respect, she is akin to the archetypal figure of nineteenth-century Paris described by Baudelaire, Fournel and Benjamin: the flâneur. She shares his condition of alienation, though from an ethno-nationalist, rather than a capitalist milieu (Benjamin 2006). Likewise, she moves through the landscapes of post-socialist/war Bosnia from which she feels estranged, with a sense of detachment, enhanced by the enclosure of the car. However, the comforting familiarity of the car, the road and the pan-Bosnian society of traffic empowers her to remain attuned (Fournel 1867), in sight, sound, smell and taste. Most importantly, she is unintentionally affected, and profoundly so, by the very act of passing through the landscape. How so? In Mira’s words, the strange becomes interesting, manageable and even familiar. In short, perhaps, and using Pearce’s terminology, driving provides an occasion for the (re-)scripting of antithetical ethno-national and pan-Bosnian belonging into a benign multiculturalism.

Conclusion
In this article, I have charted the rise of hyper-automobility in post-socialist/war Bosnia. I attributed this to three key factors: policy change, especially the de-ethnicising of vehicle license plates; the rise of trading as a ubiquitous economic activity; and, most importantly, a contradiction in the post-war settlement. On one hand, it aimed to bring peace by recognising ethno-nationalist territorial and, thereby, demographic gains. On the other, it aimed to re-establish multi-ethnicity. This resulted in the production of incentives for people to reclaim property from which they had been displaced without adequately producing conditions to enable their permanent residency in these places. As such, it led to residential transience. I went on to explore how the automobile that these factors produced enables the production of ideas of home that involve (re-)scripting the three dominant modes of identification in post-war Bosnia: ethno-national, pan-ethnic Bosnian and multicultural. In the first ethnographic part of the article, Driving from Ethno-nationalism to Bosnianism, I described growing post-war pressure for categorical ethno-nationalist identification. Against this, I argued, the restricted nature of automobile communication and the specific post-socialist and post-war conditions of Bosnia’s automobile system enable a non-ethno-national and pan-Bosnian belonging and communality to be perpetuated through driving. In the second ethnographic part of the article, Driving from Bosnianism to Multiculturalism, I described Bosnia’s increasingly ethno-nationalised and otherwise de-familiarised landscapes. Against this, I argued, the comforting familiarities of car, road and the pan-Bosnian society of traffic enable an exploratory and perambulatory approach to driving. In these, the driver is attuned to the sights, sounds, smells and tastes of these de-familiarised landscapes. This provides an occasion for the (re-)scripting of antithetical ethno-national and pan-Bosnian belonging into a benign multiculturalism. There is a clearly dystopic strain in the depiction of driving in contemporary automobility research. Apparently, it deadens the driver’s engagement with the material world beyond the car’s boundaries. It is socially isolating. Moreover, the feelings of autonomy that
these experiences may give on to are merely illusory, especially in the face of the control of an ever-expanding and pervading system of automobility. Looked at from Europe’s peripheries, rather than the northern European centres in which most of this research is conducted, experiences of driving can appear to be markedly different: engaged, sociable and remarkably empowering. Indeed, what this paper demonstrates, above all, is that these experiences of driving may sometimes be occasions for re-crafting senses of home in and coming to terms with the profound transformations taking place in, in this case, the post-socialist and post-war world.

References


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**Povzetek**


**KLJUČNE BESEDE:** avtomobilizem, nacionalizem, post-socializem, povojno obdobje, Bosna

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